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HISTORY COMES CALLING: DEAN
GRISWOLD OFFERS NEW EVIDENCE
ABOUT THE JURISDICTIONAL
DEBATE SURROUNDING THE
ENACTMENT OF THE DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT ACT

Donald L. Doernberg*
Michael B. Mushlin**

In a recent article,' we proposed that the Declaratory Judgment Act of 19342 was intended, contrary to the Supreme Court's
to enlarge the subject matter jurisdiclong-standing interpretati~n,~
tion of the federal courts. When Congress considered the Act,4 jurisdictional concerns centered around whether declaratory
~
judgments would violate the case-or-controversy c l a ~ s e ,not
whether introduction of the device would expand the federal ques~
is, intion jurisdiction Congress already had a ~ t h o r i z e d .There
-

-

*

Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A. 1966, Yale University; J.D. 1969, Columbia University.
** Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A. 1966, Vanderbilt University; J.D.
1970, Northwestern University.
The authors wish to express their gratitude to Dean Erwin N. Griswold for his
generosity in sharing his recollections and insights with them, and for permitting his
contribution to this difficult area to be published.
1. Doernberg & Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the Declaratory Judgment Act
Created a Cause of Action and Expanded Fedeml Jurisdiction While the Supreme Court
Wasn't Looking, 36 UCLA L. REV.529 (1989).
2. Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
$0 2201-02 (1982 & Supp. 1985)).
3. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
4. The Act was before Congress from 1919 to 1934. The chronology of its adoption is discussed extensively in Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 1, at 547-73.
5. U.S. CONST.art. 111, $ 2, cl. 1.
6. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)).
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deed, substantial evidence that Congress intended to expand federal
question jurisdiction to include at least two, and possibly three, case
models;' there is virtually no evidence supporting the contrary position taken by the Supreme Court in Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. and subsequent cases.9 We concluded that a complaint
seeking declaratory relief ought to be evaluated for jurisdictional
purposes on its face,1° under the same rules as complaints seeking
coercive relief. Certainly nothing in the history of the Declaratory
Judgment Act suggests that a complaint seeking declaratory relief
should be denied federal adjudication merely because the court
would have lacked jurisdiction if the complaint instead had sought
coercive relief. We therefore argued that the jurisdictional analysis
prescribed by the Court in Skelly Oil should be abandoned, and that
the Declaratory Judgment Act should be recognized as having created a cause of action and expanded federal question jurisdiction.
Dean Erwin N. Griswoldl sent the following letter in response
to our article.12 It is reprinted with his permission. Our reply
follows.
The February, 1989, issue of the UCLA Law Review came
across my desk the other day, and I was much interested in see-

p
p
-

-

-

7. The three case models are discussed in their historical context in Doernberg &
Mushlin, supra note 1, at 548, 562-73. In brief, the three models are:
(1) a "mirror-image" case, in which the party seeking the declaratory
judgment would have been the defendant in a traditional federal-question
coercive action but has not yet been sued; (2) a "federal-defense" case, in
which the defendant asserts a federal defense to the plaintiff's nonfederal
coercive action; and (3) a "federal-reply" case, in which both the complaint and answer would include only state claims but where the plaintiff's reply would raise a federal issue.
Id. at 548 (footnotes omitted).
8. 339 U.S. 667 (1950). The Court in Skelly Oil stated that Congress intended the
Declaratory Judgment Act to be "procedural only," merely "enlarg[ing] the range of
remedies available in the federal courts . . . ." Id.!at 671. On that premise, the Court
prescribed the analytical method still used today for declaratory judgment cases, in
which the jurisdictional inquiry is directed toward evaluating a hypothetical coercive
complaint corresponding to the declaratory judgment complaint that was actually filed.
See Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 1, at 544.
9. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S.
1 (1983).
10. Skelly Oil prescribed hypothetically redrafting declaratory judgment complaints as if they had sought coercive relief instead, and then evaluating the nonexistent
coercive complaint under the tests for federal question jurisdiction. See Doernberg &
Mushlin, supra note 1, at 544.
11. Dean of Hanard Law School, 19461967; Solicitor General of the United
States, 1967-73. Dean Griswold is currently a member of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue
in Washington, D.C.
12. Letter from Erwin N. Griswold to Donald L. Doernberg and Michael B.
Mushlin (Mar. 3, 1989).
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DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT
ing your article on the Declaratory Judgment Act. I have read it
with much interest, and it has brought back many memories,
since I was, in a remote sense, "present at the creation."
To explain this, I will set out a sort of long footnote to your
article.
My third year as a student at the Harvard Law School was
1927-28. During that year, I took Professor Frankfurter's course
on Federal Jurisdiction. It was a lively course, and there was
much discussion of many problems. That was the year of Liberty
Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70 (1927), and Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley, 276 U.S. 71 (1928), shortly followed by Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Association, 277 U.S. 274 (1928). All
of these cases were the subject of extensive discussion in Professor Frankfurter's class.
One of my clear memories is that Professor Frankfurter was
much concerned about "case or controversy." We dealt at
length with the Muskrat l 3 case and other matters, and the declaratory judgment problem was discussed largely in terms of
case or controversy. There was no doubt of two things-first,
that Professor Frankfurter was opposed to federal jurisdiction in
declaratory judgment cases, and, second, that much of his opposition stemmed directly from his close relationship to Justice
Brandeis.
There was, I think, substantial reason for the concern of
Justice Brandeis and Professor Frankfurter, particularly in the
atmosphere of the times when courts, including the Supreme
Court, were very free and easy in the. matter of holding statutes
unconstitutional. Specifically, the opposition of Justice Brandeis
was largely based on his experience with the "Advisory Opinion"
practice in Massachusetts, under which the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts gives opinions on the constitutional validitv of a statute before it is enacted into law. Because of Advisory Opinions, many constructive changes in the law in
Massachusetts had been stopped in their tracks, without any opportunity for practical experience.
Under the Advisory Opinion system, the constitutionality of
a proposed statute is considered in vacuo. There is no actual
case. here are no facts. There is no individual who has been
hurt, or is being protected. There is a tendency for the court
(and counsel in their argument) to hunt out the worst possible
factual assumption, and to conclude that the statute, as drawn,
would be invoked in such a case, leading to the result that the
statute should be declared unconstitutional.
Justice Brandeis and Professor Frankfurter felt that such a
question should be considered by a court only in a concrete case,
based on actual facts. Then, it might be possible, in a trial, to
present the factual background, to show what the statute would
13. [EDITOR'S
NOTE] Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
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do to this particular plaintiff, and to present facts and arguments
which would support the constitutionality of the statute as applied to those facts.
This is, I think, a real concern. A sort of reverse application
of it can be found in the case of PenneN v. City of Sun Jose, 108 S.
Ct. 849 (1988), recently decided by the Supreme Court. There,
there was an attack on the validity of an ordinance of the city of
San Jose. The effort to get a decision that the ordinance violated
the due process clause was unsuccessful because there was not
really a; actual case. There were no specific facts. There was
nothing to indicate that anyone had actually been harmed, or
even that any specific person would be harmed. There were, indeed, indications that on an actual record, with facts, there might
be a question about the validity of the ordinance. (This includes
not only clear and specific provisions of the ordinance or statute,
but also questions of the practical or administrative construction
of it. In other words, even if the statute or ordinance is subject to
an interpretation which might make it unconstitutional, that
question need not be faced if there is clear administrative or practical construction of the statute, keeping it within the bounds of
constitutionality. (I am enclosing a copy of a page from a Review article which illustrates the point.))14
Perhaps I am unduly influenced by my first encounter with
this problem, more than sixty years ago. I do think, though, that
there is room to limit the "mirror image" application of declaratory judgments, at least as far as questions of constitutionality
are concerned, so that the question of constitutionality will only
be considered on the actual facts of a real case.
Dean Griswold's letter tends t o confirm our historical conclusion'* that opposition to the declaratory judgment device arose pri14. [EDITOR'S
NOTE] The relevant portion of the page reads as follows:
In Pennell v. City of Sun Jose, [I08 S. Ct. 849 (1988)l the Court
generally approved the concept of governmental regulation of rental markets. But there is an interesting invitation contained within the first few
paragraphs of the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
The case arose in a context, according to the Chief Justice, "without any
showing in a particular case as to the consequences [of the regulation's
application, and] does not present a sufficiently concrete factual setting
for the adjudication of the takings claim the appellants raise here."
Johnson, Rent Control and the Theory of Eficient Regulation: Introduction: Is the
Supreme Court Ready for the Question, 54 BROOKLYNL. REV.729, 739 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
PenneN sought a declaration in the California courts that the new San Jose ordinance violated the takings clause of the fifth amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. V, and
the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV. The Court found that the controversy was insufficiently developed to
permit adjudication of the claim of violation of the takings clause, 108 S. Ct. at 856-57,
but it did affirm the judgment of the California Supreme Court rejecting plaintiff's due
process and equal protection claims on the merits.
15. Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 1, at 554-73.
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marily because of case-or-controversy concerns, not Gecause of any
inherent problem in expanding federal question jurisdiction within
the confines of the case-or-controversy clause. We are sensitive to
the problem of opinions being rendered in the absence of a genuine
case or controversy. Indeed, we did not mean to suggest either that
we think courts ought so to act or that Congress, in finally enacting
the Declaratory Judgment Act in 1934, suggested abandoning that
constitutional principle of judicial restraint to which justices Brandeis and Frankfurter so strongly adhered. Certainly we found no
evidence to suggest that Congress intended to establish a declaratory judgment system analogous to the Massachusetts Advisory
Opinion system to which Dean Griswold refers.16 We do think,
however, that the declaratory judgment device can encompass
many cases presenting concrete disputes appropriate for judicial
resolution. l7
To be sure, some actions seek declaratory judgments in circumstances where dismissal on case-or-controversy grounds is appropriate,'8 but that is true of cases seeking coercive relief as we11.19 We
merely think that each case must be examined individually to determine whether it presents, as the Court said in a different context,
"that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
~
in many cases, like
difficult constitutional q u e ~ t i o n s . " ~Thus,
Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation T r ~ s t , a~ '
16. Congress was aware of and hoped to avoid the problems of that system. Id. at
566-68.
17. As Professor Wright has noted, "The critical question in'each case is whether

the facts averred under the existing circumstances present a real controversy between
parties having adverse legal interests of such immediacy and reality as to warrant a
declaratory judgment." C. WRIGHT,LAW OF FEDERALCOURTS671 (4th ed. 1983)
(footnote omitted). Jurisdictional problems aside, the Supreme Court seems to have
had no difficulty in distinguishing declaratory judgment cases that do present justiciable
cases or controversies from those that do not. Compare Lake Carriers Ass'n. v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972) and Alvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943) and Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937) with Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108 S.
Ct. 849 (1988) and Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969) and Eccles v. People's
Bank, 333 U.S. 426 (1948).
18. See, e.g., Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969).
19. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Socialist Labor Party v.
Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583 (1972).
20. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). The Baker Court, of course, was
speaking of standing rather than case or controversy, but we think the Court's sentiment is transferable in this instance.
21. 463 U.S. 1 (1983). Franchise Tax Board is discussed extensively in Doernberg
& Mushlin, supra note 1, at 544-47, 578-82.
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declaratory judgment, action does present a concrete case and
should be adjudicated.
Dean Griswold's recollection of then-Professor Frankfurter's
reservations about the potential case-or-controversy problems of declaratory judgments is especially important in light of Justice
Frankfurter's authorship of the Court's opinion in SkelIy Oi1.22 By
the time Skelly Oil was written, Justice Frankfurter's views of the
constitutional problems of declaratory judgments and the jurisdictional concerns that flowed from those problems apparently had
changed from what they were when he taught Dean Griswold's
Federal Jurisdiction class. We respectfully submit that Professor
Frankfurter's understanding of jurisdictional concerns about the declaratory judgment device was more accurate and better supported
by history than was Justice Frankfurter's.

22. 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
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